Abstract: When capacity-constrained bidders have information about a good sold in a future auction, they need to take the information into account in forming today's bids. The capacity constraint makes even otherwise unrelated goods substitutes and creates an equilibrium link between future competition and current bidding strategy. This paper proves the existence and uniqueness of a strictly monotone symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium under mild conditions on the population distribution of valuations, characterizes general properties of the equilibrium bidding strategy, and provides a simple technique for numerically approximating the bidding strategy for arbitrary valuation distributions. The key property of the equilibrium is that almost all bidders submit positive bids in the first stage, thereby ensuring trade with probability one.
I. Introduction
In many auction markets, similar goods are auctioned off in a pre-announced sequence:
Governments and large firms auction off contracts for similar projects on a regular basis, often announcing future projects well in advance to allow bid-preparation. Estate auctions and auctions for property of retiring farmers are usually conducted as a sequence of auctions for the individual objects, with the entire set of auctioned goods available for inspection before the first auction begins. Consumers face sequential auctions with information about future goods on eBay, where sellers list upcoming auction-endings several days in advance. In all of the above situations, the individual auctioned goods are not necessarily identical, but they are substitutes to the bidders because of capacity constraints: a consumer buying a digital camera on eBay only has use for one camera, a construction firm can only fulfill a limited number of contracts given its technology, and a farmer may only need one tractor out of the several different tractors auctioned off in the sale of a retiring neighbor's machinery. This paper models the sequential auctioning of two objects to unit-capacity bidders who may or may not be able to dispose of one object in case they end up with both.
1 Each object is auctioned by a second-price sealed-bid auction with zero reserve. 2 Each bidder has two nonnegative private valuations, one for each object, and the pairs of valuations are drawn independently across bidders from an arbitrary bivariate distribution with a bounded density and full support on a compact rectangle. This distributional assumption is general because not only can the two valuations be arbitrarily correlated, the distribution need not be symmetric in either support or shape, and it can even be discontinuous. Departing from most previous models of sequential auctions, each bidder knows her private value of the second unit before bidding on the first unit. The main finding of this paper is that a unique strictly monotone symmetric purestrategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game exists. The equilibrium is strictly monotone in the sense that for every fixed valuation of the second object, first-auction bids strictly increase in the valuation of the first object.
In the proposed equilibrium, no bidders want to abstain from the first auction. This situation differs sharply from a best-response intuition about a rational bidder facing exogenous competition in the second stage: an exogenous second-stage competition would make a rational 1 The basic model considers the case without disposal; the extension section analyzes the impact of free disposal. 2 The extension section analyzes the impact of a first-stage reserve.
bidder abstain from the first auction whenever her option value of losing (her expected secondstage surplus), exceeded her valuation of the first unit (her maximum first-stage surplus). No first-stage abstentions happen in the proposed equilibrium because the option value of the second auction is endogenous to first-stage bidding through the Bayesian equilibrium requirements. Let the two stages of the game be "today" and "tomorrow." The key tradeoff bidders face is between winning today and bidding tomorrow (today's winner exits the game because of the unit capacity assumption and no possibility of disposal). As in other models of sequential auctions for substitutes, the optimal bidding strategy solves this tradeoff by reducing today's bid to compensate for the opportunity cost of winning today, which is equal to a loser's expected surplus from participating in tomorrow's auction. The difference in the present model is that should I lose today, the competition I will face tomorrow depends on the bid-level at which I lose today: In equilibrium, all bidders reduce their bid today as a function of their values of tomorrow's object, so losing to a lower bid today makes higher competition tomorrow more likely. At the margin, I therefore need to assess the opportunity cost of winning today not only as a function of my valuation of tomorrow's object, but also as a function of the bid I submit today.
In other words, losing at different bid-levels today is informative about the competition I can expect tomorrow. This paper analyzes this dependence and shows that it unravels any pure abstention strategy.
One way to understand the bidding incentives is to think of the first auction as an auction with a common value component arising from the fact that the opportunity cost of winning the first auction depends on the types of the other bidders. Since losing to a lower bid today makes higher competition tomorrow more likely, the common value component implies a "loser's curse" (Holt and Sherman 1994, Pesendorfer and Swinkels 1997) in that a failure to anticipate the informational content of winning makes one bid too low. Specifically, ignoring the information about tomorrow's competition contained in losing to a very low bid today would make some bidders abstain, only to be surprised tomorrow at the intensity of competition. This paper shows that taking this loser's curse into account is sufficient to rule out abstentions in a strictly monotone pure-strategy equilibrium.
The received theory of sequential auctions for substitutes focuses either on auctions of several identical units of a good (Milgrom and Weber 2000 , Black and de Meza 1992 , Katzman 1999 or on auctions of heterogeneous goods without information about future goods (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1994, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2003) . When bidders demand more than one identical unit of the same good and have diminishing marginal utility, Black and de Meza (1992) and Katzman (1999) describe equilibria in which even multi-unit-demand bidders will make their first-stage bids contingent only on their valuations of the first unit. 3 In contrast, the bidders in the proposed equilibrium always base their first-stage bids on both valuations. The proposed model generalizes Milgrom and Weber (2000) by separating the influence of information about future goods from the relationship between the private values of the two objects sold. Unlike in Milgrom and Weber's model, bidder types are two-dimensional here.
Models with multi-dimensional types are rare in the auction literature because of the technical difficulties they pose. A seminal example is the model of Che and Gale (1998) , who study the case of single-object auctions with each bidder facing a privately known budget constraint in addition to her valuation. As in Che and Gale (1998) , the solution to the proposed model uses the concept of an isobid -a level curve of the two-dimensional bidding function.
The proposed model also generalizes Gale and Hausch (1994) , who consider twodimensional information analogous to the present setting but solve the model only for two bidders. The extension to more bidders is non-trivial because it guarantees a non-degenerate second-stage competition to the losers of the first auction and leads to the endogeneity of this competition I describe above. The model predictions also differ qualitatively when more bidders are allowed: the probability of first-stage trade is less than one with only two bidders. This difference arises because the two-bidder model does not involve the loser's curse that makes bidders bid more aggressively in the first stage.
Finally, a version of the proposed model with free disposal, discussed in the Extensions section, is related and complementary to Burguet (2005) . Burguet models a sequential ascending right-to-choose auction for two condominiums, one facing East and one facing West. In Burguet's model, each bidder wants only one condo and not all bidders prefer the same exposure. However, their private information is not truly two-dimensional because sorting the bidders according to their valuations of their preferred exposure automatically sorts them according to their valuations of their less-preferred exposure (the valuation of the less-preferred exposure is a publicly known monotonic function of the preferred-exposure valuation). This restriction is enough to make a sequential right-to-choose auction efficient -a result that does not necessarily hold in the more general setting considered here. Another model of sequential auctions with information about future goods without multi-dimensional types is Zeithammer (2006) , who models auctions for movie DVDs on eBay as intertwined sequences of auctions, each sequence selling identical units of the same good (a particular movie-title) at varying timeintervals. This is analogous to Burguet's assumption with the value of the less-preferred exposure equal to zero.
In the terminology of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) , the second auction is a particular example of a positive externality in a downstream interaction among the bidders. The expected surplus of a first-auction loser is the externality, it is positive by individual rationality, and it depends on the types of the other bidders. Unlike Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) who analyze the first-stage response to a reduced-form externality with one-dimensional types, this paper models the externality in the form of another auction from structural primitives, and naturally considers two-dimensional types. As in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) , the positive externality leads to a partial pooling by "low types" whenever the seller uses a reserve price. Another model with partial pooling at the reserve price due to a positive externality is the analysis of auctions with resale by Haile (2000) . While the intuition for partial pooling by low types is the same here, the key difference with two-dimensional types lies in defining the meaning of "low type", i.e., in characterizing the continuum of valuation pairs that pool on the reserve in equilibrium. Budish (2008) uses the computational procedure this paper proposes in order to assess the efficiency and distributional properties of the auction with information about future goods vis-à-vis the efficient Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG). He finds that under several different assumptions about the distribution of bidder valuations, the sequential auction is more than 99 percent efficient. Therefore, while monotonicity of the equilibrium does not imply efficiency as it would in an auction with single-dimensional bidders, the proposed equilibrium seems to be nearly efficient.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the model, establishes existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, and derives properties of the bidding function, and illustrates the model on a special case of the uniform distribution with support on [ ] [ ] 0, 0,1 K × .Section III discusses both possible extensions and barriers to further generalization. The most important extension is to the case of free disposal, a world in which the winner of the first object can still bid on the second object and dispose of the less-preferred object should she win both. The freedisposal case is technically analogous to the costly disposal situation of Section II, and the bidding function turns out to be similar in the uniform example. Another extension considers the equilibrium that arises when the seller uses a reserve inside the support of the first-object valuations: the bidding function changes relative to the no-reserve case in that the pricedistribution has a mass-point at the reserve level. Section IV concludes by interpreting the results within a broad framework of choice and sequential search and by highlighting both the contributions of the present work and potential avenues for future research.
II. Model
Two second-price sealed-bid auctions 1 and 2 are conducted in sequence, each auction selling one object with a zero reserve. N >2 risk-neutral bidders participate in the sequence of auctions.
Each bidder has a single-object capacity in that she derives no value from a second object. 4 Each bidder knows her private valuations of the two objects ( ) 
Correlation between the private values of the two objects captures the similarity of the two objects, and hence the degree to which they are substitutes in addition to the substitution resulting from the capacity constraint. 5 The cumulative distribution of the valuations is denoted
, F H v is therefore the marginal cdf of v 2 , and ( )
For example, the objects are two different cars, and each bidder only needs one car. Or the objects are procurement contracts, and each bidding firm can fulfill only one. Or the objects are tickets to two concurrent events. 5 Consider two fundraiser dinners held simultaneously. When one is for the Republican Party and the other for the Democratic Party, the bidders' personal valuations are likely negatively correlated. In other words, the events are opposites and probably would not be substitutes without the capacity constraint. When one dinner is for the Republican Party and the other for a cause unrelated to politics, such as cancer research, then the valuations are uncorrelated: demand for one good is unrelated to demand for the other. Finally, when the two concurrent dinners are both for the Republican Party, the valuations are nearly perfectly correlated, and the two events would likely be substitutes even without the capacity constraint. Regardless of the cause each dinner supports, the two events are substitutes in the proposed model because of the capacity constraints: each participant can only attend one of them. the marginal cdf of v 1 . Extending the notation, define the cumulative distribution function under a continuous curve
. Note that the generality of the distributional assumption makes it without loss of generality to assume that the two auctions follow promptly after each other, so there is no discounting of the second auction's outcome.
While the distributional assumption is necessary for existence of a strictly monotone pure strategy equilibrium, the following assumption about the utility of winning both objects is merely convenient and will be relaxed in the Extensions section: Disposal or resale of a purchased object is costly enough that the winner of the first auction does not bid again.
6
I restrict attention to strictly monotone symmetric pure-strategy equilibria, where "monotone" means that the first-auction bids increase in v 1 for every fixed v 2 , and "strictly" rules out pooling on the same bid-level for a range of different v 1 s. The second stage has a dominant strategy to bid valuation v 2 because it is a single second-price sealed-bid auction. The dominant strategy ensures that the information disclosure in the end of the first stage is irrelevant: the second-stage bidding is the same regardless of whether the bidders learn nothing, only the price, or all the bids of the first stage. This is the principal simplification relative to the first-price does not somehow impact second-stage bidding (which is fixed by the dominant strategy 6 A demand-assumption equivalent to costly disposal would be that the value of the second object contingent on owning the first object is zero. Thus, the winner of the first car cannot sell or even throw away the first car in order to free up his garage for the second car. Analogously, the firm receiving the first contract must fulfill it before bidding again, and sub-contracting is not feasible. Or there simply is no time to turn around and re-sell won tickets to this evening's events. The Extensions section will explore the impact of free disposal. described in the previous paragraph). Instead, the information about remaining competitors enters the first-stage bidding through marginal analysis in a Bayesian equilibrium: the focal bidder assumes that should she lose the first auction, she would lose in a tie to a c 1 equal to her own bid. In other words, the focal bidder assumes she is pivotal to the outcome of the first stage.
It will be very convenient throughout this paper to describe the first-stage bidding function ( )
b v v as a set of isobids -level curves of ( )
I look for an intuitive monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in which each bidder bids their value of the first object net of her expected surplus of losing given that c 1 =v 2 : ( ) ( )
Because of the truth-revealing pivotal nature of the second-price auction, this form of the bidding function is without loss of generality in a symmetric strictly monotone pure-strategy equilibrium:
given any ( )
, b v v in such an equilibrium, is must be the case that ( ) ( )
fact the expected surplus of a first-auction loser. If not, then there is a profitable deviation.
Isobids of such a bidding function have the following convenient form:
The relationship between the isobid I and the expected surplus function S shown in equation (1) leads to a useful equilibrium restrictions on isobids, because the actual expected surplus on the RHS of equation (1) in turn depends on the isobids it implies on the LHS. Specifically,
is a set of isobids of a strictly monotone symmetric pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium ( ) ( )
each curve must satisfy : 
where X and Y are the pertinent areas under the isobid illustrated in Figure 
where the second equality follows from integration by parts 7 , and the last equality follows from equation (3). Plugging equation (4) into equation (1) completes the proof. QED Proposition 1. 
The alternative expression (2') is useful whenever
, and equation (2) is thus not defined.
I now construct a symmetric pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium with ( )
increasing in v 1 in three steps that can be outlined as follows:
1) The full support and boundedness of f imply that for every
, a unique function I exists that satisfies equation (2). This function is a candidate for an isobid curve ( )
2) The set of candidate isobids ( )
The full support and boundedness of f, together with the properties of the candidate isobids implied by equation (2), ensure that ( )
Regularity is defined as follows:
is regular when it satisfies all of the following conditions:
, S does not decrease in c 1 faster than unity:
3) The first stage has a unique best response function ( ) 
and regularity implies that ( )
the candidate isobids from Step 1 are indeed equilibrium isobids.
Step 1: Existence and uniqueness of candidate isobids
The equilibrium condition in equation (2) 
Please see the appendix for detailed proofs of all remaining propositions. Proposition 2 shows that the dashed line in Figure 1 cannot satisfy the equilibrium condition. The reason is that the slope of a candidate isobid curve at any given v 2 is proportional to the probability mass under the curve and left of v 2 , but there is no probability mass near the dashed curve's intercept, and so the Symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium considerations alone thus restrict attention to firstround bids at or above the lower bound of the support of v 1 . For bid-levels above L 1 , the candidate-isobid situation is surprisingly orderly given the mild distributional assumptions:
Proposition 3 (Existence and uniqueness of candidate equilibrium isobids) :
The proof relies on showing that a K-times repetition of the mapping T defined in equation (2) I v β is only a one-dimensional function that depends on f and does not depend on other candidate isobids.
Step 2: Regularity of the expected surplus function implied by candidate isobids
The full set of candidate isobids ( ) { } 
Extend the surplus function to the entire closed support rectangle by defining it as a limit Proposition 4 is immediate from the fact that S is an integrated cumulative distribution function:
where all inequalities are strict when 2 2 v L > . The intuition for Proposition 4 is straightforward:
The expected surplus increases in the valuation v 2 because a higher valuation makes winning 8 Mere existence follows from the Schauder fixed-point theorem because the metric space of functions in Proposition 3 is compact: Arzela-Ascoli Theorem implies that a set of continuous real functions on a compact interval is compact when it is closed, bounded, and equicontinuous. The first two conditions hold by definition, and the 1-Lipschitz continuity of the image of T(I) implies equicontinuity.
more likely and also increases the actual surplus conditional on winning. Since these two atleast-linearly increasing components effectively multiply to produce the expected surplus, the convexity results. Since increasing v 2 by a small amount can increase the expected future surplus at most by that amount (and that only in the case when future prices are guaranteed to be below v 2 ), the slope of S in v 2 is bounded above by unity. The regularity argument builds on Proposition 4 by showing that S is not only well-behaved as a function of v 2 , but also as a function of c 1 . I demonstrate the three regularity conditions A,B, and C in turn.
To show that S does not decrease in c 1 faster than unity, it is enough to show that two candidates for equilibrium isobids cannot cross or even touch each other, i.e. that ( ) 
( ) ( )
The result of Proposition 5 is implied by the full support assumption together with the fact that a slope of any candidate for equilibrium isobid ( ) 
The argument proceeds as follows: Together with compact support of the candidate isobids, the global bound on their slopes guarantees that as ε approaches zero, ( ) 
Proposition 7 (Part C of regularity and continuity at L 1 ): As c 1 approaches L 1 , ( )
Note that by defining ( ) (2) is not defined for the function ( )
is zero, but the equivalent equilibrium condition (2') holds, and so ( )
for an equilibrium isobid. Proposition 7 essentially shows that v L = can be applied to some larger v 2 for which the zipper is still closed, i.e. for which ( )
From the perspective of the bidders, an L 1 candidate isobid ( ) 
, L L realize they will lose the second auction almost surely because the probability mass under ( ) 2 1 | I v L and left of a small 2 v is zero (since an equilibrium I must have a slope and curvature of zero at L 2 ). Therefore, the cascade unravels, the
competitors bid a small amount strictly greater than L 1 , and the focal bidder ( )
, v v thus also bids strictly more than L 1 . This unraveling corrects for the loser's curse that would result from bidding L 1 .
Step 3: Candidate isobids are the best response to the candidate expected surplus function Consider a single focal bidder, and let c 1 be the highest first-stage competitive bid she faces, that is, the maximum first bid of her N-1 first-stage competitors. Suppose the focal bidder believes c 1 to be distributed according to some distribution
When S is regular, the following first-order condition characterizes the best response to S:
Regularity of S ensures both concavity of the focal bidder's objective function at the FOC and sub-optimality of corner solutions (i.e., suboptimality of bidding L 1 or H 1 ). In addition, regularity implies that the implicit function ( )
Finally, regularity of S also implies that bidding ( ) 
The form of the bidding function in Proposition 8 provides interesting intuition. Since the firststage winner does not bid again, the option value S of the second auction is the opportunity cost of winning the first item. Because of the truth-revealing property of the second-price auction, the bidder thus bids her net value of the first object, 1 v S − , and the optimal bid does not depend on the inequality holds precisely for all c 1 < B. In other words, deviation to abstaining changes the outcome of the game precisely when the highest competing bid is so low that losing the first auction results in a lower continuation surplus than winning it. Note that this is true even for
, who will win the second auction almost surely, and can only make ε surplus in the first auction. Bidding ( )
makes sense even for this bidder, because she either loses anyway, or she wins when all other competitors bid even less than ( )
All competitors bidding that low implies that their v 2 s are so close to H 2 that winning the first auction is a better deal than competing with them.
Given Propositions 1-8, stating the main theorem of this paper is finally possible: 
, and Meanwhile, the winner's surplus also shrinks. Therefore, the expected surplus from the second auction shrinks to zero and the two auctions become effectively isolated.
The key to Theorem 1 is Proposition 3 that shows existence and uniqueness of candidate equilibrium isobids. The proof of Proposition 3 in turn relies on showing that a K-times repetition of the mapping T defined in equation (2) is a contraction map, so there is a natural iterative numerical method for computing isobids:
Corollary to Theorem 1 (numerical procedure for computing ( )
The following steps can be used to numerically approximate ( ) 
by iterations of ( )
2) Construct equilibrium ( ) The key to preservation of the equilibrium bidding function under an affine transform is that the affine transform scales up both the intercept and the slope of the isobid by the same factor B.
Thus, the affine transform of the equilibrium isobids in the ( ) 
F I c v F c v A F c v F v F c H A B F c H F I c H
where A and B are the positive probability-masses between ( ) 
III. Extensions of the modeling assumptions

Free disposal of any won unit
The model of section II assumes the first-stage winner cannot dispose of the first unit if she wins the second unit. This assumption is realistic for situations in which the goods are binding contracts for specialized procurement of products or services that are difficult to subcontract: Given the chance to throw away the first object and bid again, simply bidding a tiny 0 ε > in the first stage seems costless even when 2 2 1 1 H v v L ≈ > ≈ : winning the first auction merely reduces the bidder's bid in the second auction rather than preventing bidding altogether.
Instead of foregoing the entire expected surplus ( ) 2 S v by winning the first object, the winner with free disposal only foregoes the opportunity cost of ( ) ( )
− , which should be less than v 1 − the benefit of winning the first auction with a tiny 0 ε > . Therefore, free disposal seems to guarantee trade almost surely in any symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Unfortunately, this intuition is incomplete because winning versus losing also impacts the second-stage competition: the winner faces stiffer competition than the losers. Contingent expected-surplus functions are necessary to characterize the equilibrium, as I discuss next. Since the winner faces stiffer second-stage competition than a loser (both face N-2 losers and one additional competitor, where the additional competitor is also a loser in G W , as opposed to a winner in G L , and winners bid less than losers),
Given any S L and S W , the bidders solve the following problem in the first stage:
Compared to equation (7), winning the first auction involves the additional surplus ( )
The first-order conditions are only different from equation (8) with L S instead of
The incomplete intuition of the previous paragraph notes that the term in the curly brackets must be positive for any L S that is an integrated cdf. The intuition was incomplete because the second term (in the square brackets) is always negative due to the fact that 
and it is clear that ( ) 
The line ( ) I v would rather win the first auction should everyone also abstain, but would rather abstain should someone bid at least R. As in the literature on auctions with externalities, the optimal reserve price will likely depend on the number of bidders.
Because of the multi-dimensional types, a simple characterization of the optimal reserve in a direct revelation mechanism as in Masking and Riley (1989) is not feasible. To investigate the optimal reserve at least numerically, I once again focus on the uniform case and simulate bidding for all possible reserve levels. Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 10 in the uniform case with 3 bidders and the reserve set at 0.5 -the profit-maximizing level in the absence of the second stage (Myerson 1981) . It is clear from the figure that there is a substantial mass of bidders bidding exactly reserve, and the probability of screening is greater than half. Despite this amount of pooling and screening, I find that the reserve level optimal for the first-stage revenue is still approximately 0.5 regardless of the number of bidders. Since increasing the reserve increases abstentions and hence competition in the second stage, the second-stage revenue increases in the first-stage reserve. Therefore, the first-stage reserve optimal for total revenue is strictly above the level optimal for the marginal distribution of valuations. The simulations indicate that the optimal reserve is 0.55 for 3 bidders and 0.53 for 4 bidders. Further analysis of optimal reserves is beyond the scope of this paper, but would make for an important contribution in future work.
More than two auctions in the sequence
The asymmetry and learning issues Milgrom and Weber (2000) and whether symmetric pure-strategy equilibria would exist in the first stage is unclear.
IV. Discussion
As auction-driven marketplaces become more important in the selling of both procurement contracts by firms and governments and in the selling of consumer goods on the Internet, it is important to understand the implication of their information structure on bidding behavior, market efficiency, and distribution of the realized social surplus. This paper provides a model of forward-looking bidding in a sequence of two auctions when the characteristics of the good sold in the upcoming auction are announced in advance, allowing each bidder to form a private valuation of the upcoming good before bidding in the first auction. This information structure is common in the real world, and it has a profound impact on the nature of bidding. While it is complicated to properly account for the systematic selection of future competitors by first-stage bids, the overall result is surprisingly simple: for any distribution with a density and full support on a compact rectangle, there always exists a unique strictly monotone pure-strategy equilibrium with mostly intuitive properties.
Without any restrictions on the distribution of bidder types other than full support, the equilibrium bidding has the following intuitive properties: First, equilibrium bids increase in the value of the first object and decrease in the value of the second object. Specifically, bidders bid their private values of today's object minus the expected surplus of tomorrow's auction, where the expected surplus function increases convexly in the valuation of tomorrow's unit and, less intuitively, depends on the valuation of today's unit. The expected surplus function implicitly depends on the valuation of today's unit because it is optimal for each bidder to assume that she is pivotal to the outcome of the game (a natural assumption in a second-price sealed-bid auction), and hence should she lose today's auction, she would lose in a tie with today's maximum competitive bid. Other general properties of the equilibrium bidding function include stability under affine transformation of the valuations, and comparative statics in the number of bidders and the correlation of valuations: As the number of bidders increases, the surplus function vanishes, so the auctions become effectively isolated. Negative correlation between the two private valuations also increases first stage bids, for a similar reason: the stronger the correlation, the stronger the equilibrium competition in the second stage, resulting in less expected surplus to losers of the first stage, and hence smaller opportunity cost of winning.
The main counter-intuitive property of the equilibrium is that trade happens almost surely in the first auction. Bidders do not abstain from the first auction because of the loser's curse arising from the informational link between today's bid-level and future competition. In the equilibrium, losing to very small bids implies a second-round competition so strong that winning the first object is a better deal. To correct for the loser's curse that would arise from ignoring this "bad news" about the continuation payoff, it is optimal for bidders to bid more aggressively. Not only is optimal to bid a positive amount in the first auction in equilibrium, it only makes sense to bid more than the lower bound of the support of the first-object valuations (L 1 ). This is because in a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, any bid-level β between zero and L 1 would imply the existence of a bidder who is guaranteed to encounter only strictly higher v 2 's than his own should he lose while bidding β, and so her expected second-stage surplus is zero on the margin. The best response to such a strong loser's curse is to bid the valuation of the first object in the first stage, which must be at least L 1 .
The main model (Section II) assumes that the first-stage winner cannot dispose of the won object and bid again in the second stage. Such a costly assumption is most realistic for situations in which the goods are binding contracts for specialized procurement of products or services that are difficult to subcontract. It may seem that allowing free disposal of any unit would ensure trade because any bidder could bid a very small ε>0 in the first stage, participate in the second stage, and throw away the lesser-valued object should she win both. The extension of the model for free disposal (Section IV) demonstrates that this reasoning is incomplete because of the systematic selection of second-round competitors: the first-auction winner always faces a tougher competition in the second round than a first-auction loser. Despite this complication, the arguments developed in Section II can be extended to show that there exists a unique strictly monotone pure-strategy equilibrium even in the case of free disposal.
A fruitful area of future work is the question of optimal auctioning to the multidimensional bidders in the present model. Jehiel et al (1999) demonstrate that the general optimal incentive-compatible design can be very complex. A second best approach to optimal selling may be to at least optimize the first-stage reserve price. I show that the modeling approach based on isobids generalizes readily to a first-stage reserve inside the support of the first-object valuations, as does the computational technique. Using the generalized technique, I
explore the possible reserve-levels, and find that, at least in the uniform case, the optimal firststage reserve depends on the number of bidders and exceeds the level optimal for sale of a single object to bidders drawn from the marginal distribution.
Generalizing the model to more than two stages under the current assumptions would be cumbersome. When there are more than two auctions in a sequence, the bidders still shade their bids in expectation of a positive future surplus. However, the optimal bidding strategies are no longer symmetric and no longer depend only on each bidder's private information, because there is useful information in prices and other experiences bidders encounter along the way. However, at least a limited extension of the proposed model to many stages would be desirable.
Appendix: Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose such a candidate isobid I exists. Note that equation (2) implies that any candidate isobid is an integrated cumulative density function, and so it must be continuous and nondecreasing. Equation (2) 
Since I is nondecreasing, [ ] , 0 F I w = for every * w v ≤ . In other words, all bidders along I with 2 * v v ≤ are guaranteed to encounter strictly superior competitors in the second round with probability one (should they lose on the margin at bid-level β). Therefore, the RHS of equation (2) 
: B c B c → T . The remainder of the proof shows that for every , ,
The following Lemma is critical for the result: 
1 , 2 ! ,1
for every positive constant C, this limit as K grows proves a K exists high enough that T K is a contraction. QED Proposition 3. 
This inequality based on the equilibrium relation is a contradiction with the ordering of slopes necessary for an intersection at v*. Intuitively, a single intersection at v* forces the conditional probability of a 2 * v v < greater for the higher and flatter isobid, and this conditional probability happens to be the slope of the isobid at v*. 
, , * , , Figure A2 ). From full support of f, 
Proof of Proposition 6:
It is enough to show that ( ) 
Monotonicity further implies that for every δ, ( 2  2  1  2  1  2  1  2  2  2 Pick any 0. Uniform convergence of isobids be such that < , b v ,v is well defined by the FOC, consider the following implications of regularity (and see Figure A1 for an illustration): Part A) implies that the RHS of equation (8) does not increase in β faster than unity. Part C) fixes the intercept of the RHS at ( )
Since the LHS of equation (8) 
